After analyzing a series of recently published primary sources a number of conclusions can be drawn about Joseph Stalin’s diplomacy from 1933-1939. The General Secretary of the Soviet Union displayed a surprising flexibility in the field of foreign policy. The Soviet leader responded to the crises that developed in Europe and altered his strategy in order to enhance the USSR’s national security. He made every effort to collaborate with his ideological enemies, the capitalists, in spite of the opposition by some of his countrymen.

The rise of Nazi Germany in the early 1930’s posed a threat to the sovereignty of the Soviet Union. Stalin reacted to this danger by adopting the foreign policy of collective security. Together with his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stalin attempted to deter Germany from acting aggressively by aligning with Britain and France. The Soviet Union continued to employ this strategy despite numerous setbacks at Abyssinia in 1935, the Rhineland in 1936, and the Anschluss in 1938. The balance of power shifted dramatically after the Munich Conference, however, and the Soviet leader was forced to reassess his options in late 1938. A last-ditch effort to negotiate an alliance with Britain and France failed in the spring of 1939. As a result, Stalin concluded that his most viable option was an agreement with Germany, which would buy the USSR time and avoid war. On August 23, 1939, the Nazi-Soviet Pact of Non-Aggression was signed, barely a week before the Second World War began.